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Abstract 
This paper investigates how unusual trading volume of stocks precede 
favourable/unfavourable merger or acquisition announcements. I find that the 
cumulative abnormal returns after the announcement are on average lower on 
stocks that experience unusually low or high trading volume prior to the 
announcement day than on normal volume stocks. My findings contradict slightly 
with the previous literature, which supports the idea that unusually high trading 
volume signals more positive future returns. The data consists of the United States 
stocks from 2002 to 2015. The focus is on the target stocks – i.e. the company being 
acquired or merged into the buying company. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Analysing trading volume is the next revolution in financial economics.” – Cochrane (2007) 
 
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the abnormal return reaction to mergers and 
acquisition announcements, e.g. Borges and Gairifo (2013). Although, it should be noted that studies 
by e.g. Agrawal et al (1992) have shown that the abnormal returns will fade away in the years 
following the announcement. While the abnormal return reactions of merger and acquisition 
announcements have been the interest of numerous studies, the abnormal volume hasn’t been the 
centre of many studies. Jansen (2015) argues that volume reactions provide another, critical and 
distinct insight into the contents of the announcement. 
Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) present a phenomenon called the high-volume return 
premium. They investigated the effect trading volume might have on future prices. Gervais, Kaniel 
and Mingelgrin (2001) found that individual stocks whose trading volume is unusually large (small) 
tend to experience larger (smaller) returns in the near future. They offer the main explanation for 
that to be the stock’s visibility.  
Miller (1977) and Mayshar (1983) claim that owners of a stock tend to be overly optimistic about its 
prospect. The effect seems to be even greater if there are constraints on short-selling. Also, the 
positive shock of trading volume is bigger than the negative shock, for which they offer a couple of 
explanations. Firstly, shocks that attract new investors towards a stock usually increases the price, 
whereas during a negative shock the potential set of sellers is restricted to the current stockholders, 
which results in a smaller drop in price, i.e. if there are short-selling constraints. Correspondingly, 
Arbel and Strebel (1982), Arbel (1985), and Merton (1987) argue that when the amount of analysts 
and traders increases for particular stock, its value should increase since the change reduces the 
estimation risk faced by other investors. Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) also argue that 
increased trading activity affects the pool for potential investors through e.g. news, word of mouth 
and the Internet. 
An influential article, Akbas (2016), studies the unusually low volume prior to earnings 
announcements which tends to predict an unfavourable earnings surprise. His findings support the 
view that unusually low trading volume is a signal of bad news about firm fundamentals since, under 
short-selling constraints, informed short sellers cannot profit on their insight. His findings further 
suggest that the underlying driver for the volume prompted price movements is different for 
unusually high volume shocks and low volume shocks.  
The idea that, under short-selling constraints, unusually low trading activity is a signal of bad news 
is presented by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). According to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), 
“Periods of the absence of trade are bad news because they indicate an increased chance of 
informed traders with bad news who are constrained from selling short”. 
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Diamond and Verrechia (1987) say that short sellers and traders with more information than rest of 
the market, and whose trading activity signals negative information about the fundamentals of the 
firm. In frictionless stock markets no short-selling constraints would exist and short sellers would be 
able to trade their information on the markets freely, thus reflecting all information in the stocks 
trading volume and price about the expectations of the asset. Nevertheless, in a market where 
short-selling constraints exist, the sudden lack of trading might indicate that short sellers are forced 
to not participate in the trading. 
This paper focuses on studying the situation when unusually high or low trading volume occurs prior 
to merger and acquisition announcement and how it reflects the future returns of that particular 
stock. I focus on the sellers’ side, i.e. the company being bought out or merged into the acquiring 
company. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to study this particular effect. I received the idea 
to investigate this issue from Ferhat Akbas’s article The Calm Before the Storm (2016) from the 
Journal of Finance where the author suggested to further improve our understanding about unusual 
trading activity by examining unscheduled events, such as merger and acquisition announcements. 
 
2. Previous literature and hypotheses 
 
2.2 Unusual volume and returns 
Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) investigated how trading activity might conceal information 
about future price of the stock. They found that stocks with unusually large (small) trading activity 
over a day or week period tend to have larger returns the consecutive month. The essence of their 
findings are portrayed in figure 1 below1. My initial hypothesis was derived from these results: an 
unusually high (low) volume prior to the announcement should result in higher (lower) returns after 
the announcement. 
                                                          
1 Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001). Journal of Finance 56, p. 878.   
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In the article written by Gervais et al (2001) the main hypothesis was to test whether the trading 
volume of a stock has any information in predicting the stock’s returns. According to them, the 
efficient market hypothesis argues that the trading volume should not have any explanation power 
over the future returns of a stock since all the possible information should be reflected in the price 
of the stock. However, this doesn’t seem to be the case, as it seems there are certain agents with 
information that isn’t reflected in the prices of stocks. 
 
2.3 Unusual volume prior to earnings announcements 
Beaver’s (1968) study of earnings announcements suggest that earnings and dividend 
announcements are often accompanied by unusual changes in the stock’s price and trading volume. 
Additionally, Bamber and Cheon (1995) show that earnings announcements with large trading 
volume but small price change tend to be ensued by price increases. 
Alpo Panula 
Unusual trading activity prior to merger and acquisition announcements – evidence from the United States 
 
 
 
5 
 
Akbas (2016) takes the investigation further by providing evidence that stocks that experience 
unusually low trading volume over the week before earnings announcements tend to have more 
unfavourable earnings surprises. He measures the unusual volume by comparing a stock’s average 
daily turnover over the week, which he calls event period, prior to earnings announcement date and 
the stock’s previous 10 weeks of turnover, which he calls the reference period. By this comparison 
he categorises the stocks to be either a) low volume b) high volume or c) normal volume stock. 
The author also remarks in his article about the findings of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001), which state that high level of trading volume is 
actually negatively related to future returns. Instead, it is the unusually high level of trading volume 
that is positively correlated with future returns. 
Akbas (2016) found an important finding in addition to his finding, that unusually low volume before 
the earnings announcement tend to contain negative information about the future cash flows of 
the stock: there is no significant relation between unusually high trading volume and earnings 
surprises. This finding proposes that high volume shocks do not contain positive information about 
firm fundamentals. Thus, the information content of low and high volume shocks differ. 
 
2.4 Trading volume around merger and acquisition announcements 
Jansen (2015) studies the abnormal volume reaction to merger and acquisition announcements. 
However, he doesn’t investigate the causality between abnormal returns and abnormal trading 
volume. 
Jansen (2015) found that abnormal trading volume occurs well before the announcement date. The 
abnormal trading volume becomes significantly positive 5 days before the announcement dates at 
2.4% above the normal volume and steadily grows to almost 10% on one day before the 
announcement dates. Therefore, he argues, there may be informed trading taking place before the 
public announcement. 
Moeller et al (2004) documents four characteristics prior to merger and acquisition announcements 
that have the biggest impact in abnormal return reaction: 1) firm size 2) method of payment 3) 
target ownership and 4) relative size. Jansen (2015) focuses on the same characteristics and finds 
that the biggest abnormal volume reactions are produced when 1) acquirer’s size is small 2) method 
of payment is equity 3) target ownership is public and 4) relative size of the acquirer (compared to 
the acquisition size) is small. 
 
2.5 Abnormal returns and merger and acquisition announcements 
As stated before, the abnormal returns around merger and acquisition announcements is a known 
phenomenon. For instance, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) study the 
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wealth effects on mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. and conclude, that targets clearly gain 
abnormal returns. Also, Franks and Harris (1989) investigate the effects of U.K. takeovers on 
shareholder wealth and as well find that target firms’ shareholders gain abnormal returns. 
Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) provide a real options framework to analyse stock returns in mergers 
and acquisitions. Their sample consists of 1,086 takeovers of publicly traded U.S. firms between 
1985 and 2002. Their investigation shows that the 3-day (1 day prior to and 1 day after 
announcements) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 18.21% for the target firms’ stocks. Their 
findings are presented in figure 2 below. The main driver for the anomaly seems to be that the 
acquirers tend to pay premium for the target’s stock, so that the shareholders would be willing to 
sell the rest of the shares, which results in higher share prices, and thus abnormally high returns. 
 
Figure 2. Announcement returns for target. Findings by Hackbarth and Morellec (2008). 
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
My main hypothesis focuses on the case where unusually low trading volume occurs before the 
announcement date on the target firm’s stock. The hypothesis derives from the following idea: 
when informed traders are aware of a slightly negative merger or acquisition announcement in the 
near future (i.e. for instance a takeover that will result in a bad outcome for the shareholders of the 
target) and short-selling constraints exist, they are kept from trading their information, thus leading 
to lower trading volumes. Therefore, there should be a distinct difference in cumulative abnormal 
returns between the unusually low volume trading stocks and normal volume stocks. 
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In addition to this, my secondary hypothesis focuses on the high volume trading stocks. My findings 
should be similar to Akbas’ (2016), and thus the information content between high and low trading 
stocks are different and the high volume does not correlate with higher returns. Although, Gervais 
et al (2001) argues that the high volume trading stocks will have high returns, which is also possible. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this study consists of public U.S. merger and acquisition target stocks from 2002 to 
2015. The data considering the mergers and acquisitions was taken from Securities Data Company’s 
(SDC) databases. All information regarding the returns, volumes, prices and shares outstanding were 
acquired from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  
The data sample consists of 2,790 individual mergers or acquisitions. All announcements, which 
resulted in the acquirer gaining over 50% ownership in the target firm were left in the data. If 
information regarding trading volume, return on shares, M&A announcement date or shares 
outstanding were not found, the transaction was left out of the investigation’s scope. Share data 
that was missing trading days or couldn’t be combined with other databases due to missing 
identification data was left out, as well.  
 
Overview of the data 
N (all) 2,805 
N (no micro cap firms) 1,304 
Amount of returns (all) 156,823 
Amount of returns (no micro cap) 73,219 
Average CAPM beta (all) 0.64 
Average CAPM beta (no micro cap) 0.85 
Median market value (all) $291M 
 
Table 1. Overview of the data 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The study follows loosely the method provided by Gervais et al (2001), where stocks are classified 
as low, normal or high volume stocks with dummy variables by comparing reference and event 
period volumes of each individual stock. The announcement date of a merger or acquisition is stated 
as day 0. Event period is a 7-day long period before the announcement date, [-8,-2]. Reference period 
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is defined to be [-50,-10[, i.e. 40 days prior to the event period. Cumulative abnormal average 
returns (CAAR) are calculated for [-1,30]. CAARs were calculated for each day to compare whether 
unusually high (low) volume stocks differ return-wise from normal volume stocks. 
Average shares outstanding for any share i for the period was calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖,𝑡
30
−50
𝑁𝑖,[−50,30]
 
where  
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of shares outstanding for share i at time t 
t is the days till the event day  
N stands for the amount of trading days used in the calculations.  
Therefore, the average shares outstanding was calculated for the whole period of the study, i.e. [-
50,30]. 
 
Turnover for stock i in a given day j is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇
𝑖
 
where  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑗 is the trading volume taken from WRDS measured in thousands. 
 
Average turnover for the stock i in the period [j,k] is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖  [𝑗, 𝑘] =
∑ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
𝑗
𝑁𝑖,[𝑗,𝑘]
 
where  
𝑁𝑖,[𝑗,𝑘] is the amount of trading days for stock i. 
 
Next, each stock was classified as a) low volume, b) normal volume or c) high volume share. The 
average turnover during the event period was compared to the average turnover during the 
reference period.  
Whether or not the stock i is classified as unusually low volume stock, the following formula is used: 
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𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖  [−8, −2]
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 [−50, −10[
≤ (100% − 𝑥) 
 
where x was used to determine the magnitude of difference between low and high volume shares. 
To classify stock i as high volume stock, the formula is as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖  [−8, −2]
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 [−50, −10[
≥ (100% + 𝑥) 
 
Therefore, for the stock i to be classified as a low (high) volume stock, its average event period 
turnover has to be x smaller (bigger) than the average reference period turnover. Stocks that aren’t 
classified as low or high volume stocks are automatically classified as normal volume stocks. Bigger 
the x, bigger the size of the normal volume stock sample. 
As a robustness check, different x’s were used to check whether the results abide. 
 
Return for any share i for any given day j is calculated the following way: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑗−1
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑗−1
 
where  
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑗 is the stock i’s return on day j.  
 
Betas were calculated for each stock i following way: 
𝛽𝑖 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑀)
𝜎𝑀2
 
where 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑀 is the return of the S&P 500 (i.e. the market portfolio in this study) 
𝜎𝑀
2 is the variance of the return of the market portfolio 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑀) is the covariance between the return of the market and the return of the asset 
The individual betas were calculated in the period [-150,-50] with respect to the announcement day. 
 
Expected return is calculated as follows (capital asset pricing model): 
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𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖) = 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑀 − 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑓) 
where 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑓 is the risk free rate 
As risk-free rate 1.3%2 was used, i.e. U.S. 3-month T-Bill average during the whole period. 
 
Next I calculated the abnormal returns for each stock i the following way: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 = 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖) 
 
Then cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for stock i for any given period [j,k] was computed the 
following way: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑗,𝑘] = ∑ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
𝑗
 
 
Finally, average CAR was calculated for 1) low volume stocks 2) normal volume stocks and 3) high 
volume stocks with the formulas provided. 
As mentioned before, different x’s were used to see if the results stay the same. This means the 
criteria for choosing the three different types of stocks varies to make sure the results aren’t due to 
selection bias. Also, Welch two sample t-tests for mean differences were conducted to see whether 
the results are statistically significant. In addition to this, the calculations above were done without 
the micro-cap firms whose average market value in the reference period is less than 300M.  
 
Amount of firms in each group, all firms 
                      x 25 % 50 % 75 % 
Dummy_LOW 989 398 96 
Dummy_HIGH 891 627 474 
 
Table 2. Amount of firms in each group with different x’s, all firms. 
 
 
                                                          
2 http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html 
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Amount of firms in each group, no micro cap 
                      x 25 % 50 % 
Dummy_LOW 355 70 
Dummy_HIGH 398 267 
   
Table 3. Amount of firms in each group with different x’s, no micro cap firms. 
4. Results, robustness checks and interpretation 
4.1 Main findings 
The main findings may be found in figures 3, 4 and 5 below. The x-axis shows the number of days, 
where day 0 is the event day, i.e. the day of the merger or acquisition announcement. The y-axis 
shows the cumulative abnormal average return (CAAR). In the caption of the charts is described 
what x was used in the calculations of CAAR. Higher the x, higher the difference between volumes 
on stocks classified as normal and unusual.  
 
 
Figure 3. CAAR [-1, 30], where x = 25%. 
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Figure 4. CAAR [-1, 30], where x = 50% 
 
 
Figure 5. CAAR [-1, 30], where x = 75% 
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Two major findings may be seen from the figures above: 1) as Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) have 
shown, the cumulative abnormal average return is significantly positive for target firms during the 
period [-1, 1], which is mostly explained by the premium the buyer has to pay.  The graphs show 
that the CAAR has a clear downwards trend after that. These findings are in line with the findings of 
e.g. Jensen and Ruback (1983). 2) Stocks that are classified to have an unusual trading volume prior 
to the announcement experience most of the time lower cumulative abnormal average returns than 
the normal return stocks. 
My initial hypothesis was that stocks classified as unusually low volume should have lower returns 
than normal volume stocks. That hypothesis appears to be true according to the data. My second 
hypothesis revolved around the high volume stocks. It appears that unusually high volume does not 
precede higher abnormal returns than normal volume stocks. As Akbas (2016) argued, the 
information content is different between the normal, high and low volume stocks. Thus, I accept 
both hypotheses with some uncertainty. T-tests are shown in the next section. 
 
4.2 Two sample t-tests 
I conducted individual Welch two sample t-tests for each of the calculations in figures 3, 4 and 5. 
The results are shown below in tables 1 and 2. The values in the tables are p-values testing whether 
the means of the two individual groups differ significantly each day during the CAAR period [-1, 30].  
Low vs normal tests whether unusually low volume stocks’ CAARs differ significantly from normal 
trading volume CAARs. High vs normal tests whether unusually high volume stocks’ CAARs are 
notably different from normal volume stocks’ CAARs. Low vs high is a test whether the two groups 
differ significantly from each other in terms of CAAR. Light green values mean the results are 
significant at 5% level, i.e. the p-value is smaller than 0.05. Dark green indicates the result is 
significant at 1% level. 
The most important notes from these t-tests are: 1) most of the results where unusual volume 
CAARs are compared to normal volume CAARs are statistically significant or very significant when x 
= 25% or x = 50%. 2) The results at x = 75% mostly aren’t statistically significant. The sample size of 
the unusual volume stocks is too small. 3) Unusually high and low volume stocks don’t generally 
have statistically significant difference between them.  
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 x = 25% x = 50% 
Days 
Low vs 
normal 
High vs 
normal 
Low vs 
high 
Low vs 
normal 
High vs 
normal 
Low vs 
high 
-1 0.9819 0.4984 0.5717 0.2329 0.7608 0.1692 
0 0.5716 0.0068 0.0375 0.3596 0.0297 0.4507 
1 0.0028 0.0008 0.8369 0.0041 0.0091 0.4574 
2 0.3012 0.5441 0.5431 0.0494 0.6951 0.0840 
3 0.0297 0.3143 0.1467 0.0057 0.2718 0.0371 
4 0.0023 0.0019 0.9168 0.0296 0.0083 0.9995 
5 0.1179 0.0234 0.5184 0.1130 0.0265 0.8237 
6 0.0004 0.0000 0.6043 0.0013 0.0004 0.4698 
7 0.7368 0.0875 0.0573 0.8843 0.1658 0.2903 
8 0.0139 0.0000 0.1949 0.0013 0.0001 0.6197 
9 0.0348 0.7087 0.0525 0.0042 0.9785 0.0038 
10 0.0287 0.2557 0.1771 0.0638 0.4115 0.1864 
11 0.0009 0.0008 0.9112 0.0123 0.0040 0.9519 
12 0.0138 0.0541 0.5299 0.0311 0.0920 0.3917 
13 0.0027 0.0002 0.7501 0.0906 0.0074 0.8021 
14 0.5058 0.0616 0.0194 0.8318 0.0413 0.2683 
15 0.0115 0.0001 0.5328 0.0028 0.0009 0.4090 
16 0.0980 0.5289 0.2399 0.0084 0.6968 0.0202 
17 0.0036 0.0151 0.3145 0.1198 0.0961 0.6673 
18 0.0002 0.0000 0.8585 0.0037 0.0003 0.8659 
19 0.0536 0.1749 0.5091 0.0298 0.1952 0.2331 
20 0.0019 0.0151 0.1871 0.0535 0.1233 0.3978 
21 0.1925 0.2415 0.0172 0.5082 0.2237 0.1508 
22 0.0142 0.0001 0.5429 0.0091 0.0015 0.5623 
23 0.0082 0.8558 0.0121 0.0007 0.9599 0.0011 
24 0.0111 0.1221 0.1730 0.0684 0.2962 0.2621 
25 0.0001 0.0000 0.6491 0.0076 0.0000 0.4992 
26 0.0205 0.3304 0.1850 0.0262 0.4553 0.1190 
27 0.0001 0.0003 0.1253 0.0279 0.0219 0.4247 
28 0.1434 0.0740 0.0022 0.3123 0.1079 0.0409 
29 0.0329 0.0013 0.6588 0.0121 0.0043 0.5066 
30 0.0143 0.9025 0.0098 0.0014 0.7951 0.0010 
 
Table 4. Welch Two Sample t-test p-values, x=25% and 50%. 
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 x = 75% 
Days Low vs normal High vs normal Low vs high 
-1 0.0406 0.5857 0.0279 
0 0.0083 0.7745 0.0253 
1 0.2602 0.9964 0.3348 
2 0.2682 0.1538 0.1012 
3 0.9517 0.8785 0.9701 
4 0.3472 0.0171 0.4970 
5 0.4809 0.5963 0.7797 
6 0.5892 0.6132 0.4214 
7 0.0000 0.3749 0.0000 
8 0.4574 0.4215 0.2538 
9 0.0642 0.2629 0.0255 
10 0.5982 0.7148 0.4767 
11 0.0755 0.0377 0.7979 
12 0.6740 0.7993 0.8351 
13 0.3658 0.5703 0.2421 
14 0.0000 0.4828 0.0000 
15 0.4645 0.4903 0.2951 
16 0.1096 0.1728 0.0375 
17 0.3697 0.6769 0.2841 
18 0.2054 0.0051 0.6027 
19 0.6152 0.2720 0.8176 
20 0.4896 0.6105 0.7124 
21 0.0000 0.2467 0.0000 
22 0.5550 0.5894 0.4118 
23 0.0466 0.1300 0.0118 
24 0.1854 0.6086 0.3494 
25 0.1617 0.0015 0.5732 
26 0.9565 0.5938 0.6853 
27 0.4879 0.6859 0.3887 
28 0.0000 0.8908 0.0000 
29 0.5033 0.7603 0.4383 
30 0.0893 0.1144 0.0232 
 
 
Table 5. Welch Two Sample t-test p-values, x=75%. 
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4.3 Micro-cap stocks omitted 
I also calculated the cumulative abnormal average returns without micro-cap stocks, i.e. firms 
whose market value is less than $300M. The results look similar to the previous results that 
include all firms with an even bigger difference between the unusual volume and normal volume 
CAARs. The results are shown in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. CAAR [-1, 30], where x = 50% and micro-cap firms are omitted from the sample. 
 
4.4 Interpretation of the results 
The results seem to point out that the volume of target stocks holds important information 
regarding an upcoming merger or acquisition. Both unusually low and high volume before the 
announcement precede lower cumulative abnormal returns than the normal volume stocks 
experience.  
Explanation for the unusually low volume returns could be the one provided by Akbas (2016) for 
earnings surprises – under short-selling constraints, informed agents are unable to sell their stock 
before the announcement. Although, the explanation probably isn’t the same, since all of the three 
stock groups provide significant abnormal returns. Therefore, if any agent was well informed and 
could predict the upcoming M&A announcement, she should be stacking on the stock, regardless of 
0
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whether it would be a great announcement or a decent one – either way the targets’ stockholders 
earn abnormal returns.  
One possible explanation could be that the stocks experiencing low trading volume are the ones 
with negative predictions of the firm fundamentals, as shown by e.g. Diamond and Verrechia (1987), 
which ultimately allows the acquirer to pay smaller price for the target firm. The bid has a big impact 
in the near-future price of the target firm, thus making the CAAR smaller on unusually low volume 
firms. Therefore, the unusually low volume isn’t wholly because of the upcoming merger or 
acquisition announcement, but because informed traders know the firm isn’t well suited for making 
great cash flows, thus making them not interested in buying the stock, and under short-selling 
constraints, unable to sell them. This study isn’t comprehensive enough to be certain what the 
explanation is and I will leave the closer inspections to future investigations. 
Unusually high-volume stocks experiencing lower CAAR after the announcement could be explained 
by informed traders buying the stock well before the announcement, thus making the price on the 
announcement date higher which in essence makes the relative return smaller. The returns before 
day -1 could therefore be higher on high volume stocks than on normal trading stocks, which makes 
the CAAR for the period [-1, 30] smaller, although the returns, for instance, for period [-50, 30] could 
be higher for high volume stocks than normal volume stocks. 
Also, as Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) found out, stocks with high trading volume 
actually experience lower returns. They argue that the reasons for this is high liquidity, which 
essentially makes the stock less risky, thus lowering the expected return. They argue that high 
trading volume is a decent proxy for measuring liquidity. Therefore, the lower cumulative abnormal 
returns might not have anything to do with the announcement, but rather other characteristics. 
5. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
In this paper I investigate the information content of unusually high (low) trading volume about 
upcoming merger or acquisition announcement. I focused entirely on the target side. I find that the 
normal volume stocks have higher cumulative abnormal returns after the announcement dates than 
the ones experiencing unusual trading volume prior to the announcements of merger or acquisition.  
This paper contributes to the ongoing research on trading volumes and what information it contains 
that the prices of the stocks don’t. Unlike previous literature, I focus on the unusual volumes 
preceding merger and acquisition announcements. To my knowledge, no similar study has been 
conducted before. CAAR after the announcement should contain some information on the size of 
the bid – whether it was considered high or not by the stockholders of the target or compared to 
the intrinsic value. Thus, normal volume stocks should experience the most positive price shock in 
the event of M&A announcement. 
In this paper I focused on finding if there is correlation between the unusual volume and the returns 
merger and acquisition announcements. Our knowledge could be further improved by broadening 
the scope of the investigation. For instance, an extension to this study could be conducted by 
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investigating the bidder firms, i.e. the buying firms. Also, the rationale and mechanisms between 
the difference in returns of normal and unusual trading volume stocks should be further 
investigated. For instance, a study could be conducted with different event and reference periods 
and different market areas, e.g. Europe. Also, the cumulative abnormal average returns could be 
calculated for many different time frames to truly see the whole picture. 
In addition to these recommendations, more studies could be conducted based loosely on the same 
methodology; unusual trading volume could be investigated before other surprises, e.g. changes in 
the firm’s management, big changes in the strategy or to predict whether the firm will go bankrupt 
in the near future. The volumes of stocks seem to hold important information about the 
fundamentals of the firms and remains an interesting area of study in the future. 
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7. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Overview of the returns when x=25%. 
 
Event days CAAR, all 
CAAR, 
normal 
volume 
CAAR, low 
volume 
CAAR, 
high 
volume 
Average 
AR (all) 
avg AR 
LOW 
avg AR 
HIGH 
-1 0.3 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.7 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.7 % 
0 17.0 % 17.3 % 16.8 % 17.0 % 16.8 % 16.7 % 16.6 % 
1 23.1 % 23.3 % 23.3 % 22.6 % 6.6 % 6.9 % 5.9 % 
2 23.1 % 23.7 % 23.4 % 22.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % -0.2 % 
3 21.7 % 22.9 % 21.7 % 20.3 % 0.6 % 0.4 % 0.8 % 
4 21.1 % 23.6 % 20.4 % 19.3 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
5 22.3 % 21.5 % 21.9 % 23.6 % -0.5 % -1.0 % -0.1 % 
6 22.0 % 20.7 % 22.0 % 23.2 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.7 % 
7 21.6 % 22.4 % 21.3 % 20.9 % -0.4 % -0.4 % -0.5 % 
8 21.0 % 22.0 % 20.6 % 20.5 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.4 % 
9 20.9 % 21.6 % 20.9 % 20.1 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.5 % 
10 19.4 % 21.1 % 19.0 % 17.9 % -0.5 % -0.7 % -0.5 % 
11 19.1 % 21.7 % 18.0 % 17.7 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.5 % 
12 20.3 % 19.6 % 19.3 % 22.2 % -0.5 % -0.8 % -0.4 % 
13 20.0 % 18.9 % 20.0 % 21.2 % -0.6 % -0.6 % -0.7 % 
14 19.7 % 20.6 % 19.5 % 19.0 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.4 % 
15 19.3 % 20.3 % 19.0 % 18.5 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.3 % 
16 19.6 % 20.5 % 19.5 % 18.6 % -0.3 % -0.3 % -0.4 % 
17 17.7 % 19.9 % 17.2 % 15.7 % -0.5 % -0.5 % -0.6 % 
18 17.5 % 20.9 % 16.5 % 15.3 % -0.4 % -0.4 % -0.4 % 
19 18.7 % 18.5 % 17.9 % 19.8 % -0.6 % -0.7 % -0.6 % 
20 18.0 % 17.5 % 17.4 % 19.1 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.5 % 
21 17.5 % 18.6 % 17.0 % 17.0 % -0.4 % -0.4 % -0.5 % 
22 17.5 % 19.2 % 16.8 % 16.4 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
23 17.8 % 19.3 % 17.6 % 16.3 % -0.4 % -0.4 % -0.6 % 
24 15.4 % 18.0 % 14.5 % 13.5 % -0.6 % -0.7 % -0.4 % 
25 15.3 % 19.0 % 14.1 % 12.8 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.4 % 
26 16.7 % 17.4 % 15.5 % 17.5 % -0.3 % -0.3 % -0.3 % 
27 15.8 % 16.4 % 14.8 % 16.3 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
28 15.4 % 17.2 % 14.2 % 14.8 % -0.5 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
29 15.3 % 17.3 % 14.7 % 13.6 % -0.5 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
30 15.5 % 17.3 % 15.2 % 13.7 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
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Appendix 2: Overview of the returns when x=50%. 
 
Event days CAAR, all 
CAAR, 
normal 
volume 
CAAR, 
low 
volume 
CAAR, 
high 
volume 
Average 
AR (all) 
avg AR 
LOW 
avg AR 
HIGH 
-1 0.3 % 0.3 % -0.1 % 0.6 % 0.3 % -0.1 % 0.6 % 
0 17.0 % 17.5 % 16.0 % 16.4 % 16.8 % 16.1 % 16.1 % 
1 23.1 % 23.3 % 24.2 % 21.8 % 6.6 % 8.7 % 5.8 % 
2 23.1 % 23.5 % 23.6 % 21.5 % 0.0 % -0.5 % -0.1 % 
3 21.7 % 22.1 % 23.7 % 19.3 % 0.6 % 0.4 % 0.7 % 
4 21.1 % 22.1 % 21.7 % 17.9 % -0.4 % -0.7 % -0.7 % 
5 22.3 % 22.4 % 20.6 % 23.1 % -0.5 % -1.1 % 0.0 % 
6 22.0 % 21.8 % 21.8 % 22.5 % -0.5 % -0.7 % -0.7 % 
7 21.6 % 22.1 % 21.2 % 20.2 % -0.4 % -0.7 % -0.4 % 
8 21.0 % 21.5 % 20.7 % 19.8 % -0.4 % -0.6 % -0.4 % 
9 20.9 % 21.4 % 20.3 % 19.8 % -0.5 % -0.8 % -0.6 % 
10 19.4 % 20.0 % 20.3 % 17.0 % -0.5 % -0.7 % -0.5 % 
11 19.1 % 19.9 % 19.3 % 16.7 % -0.5 % -1.0 % -0.5 % 
12 20.3 % 20.6 % 16.7 % 21.8 % -0.5 % -1.1 % -0.4 % 
13 20.0 % 20.1 % 18.6 % 20.8 % -0.6 % -0.8 % -0.7 % 
14 19.7 % 20.4 % 18.9 % 18.3 % -0.5 % -0.9 % -0.5 % 
15 19.3 % 20.0 % 18.4 % 17.8 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.4 % 
16 19.6 % 20.2 % 18.6 % 18.1 % -0.3 % -0.3 % -0.4 % 
17 17.7 % 18.6 % 18.3 % 14.7 % -0.5 % -0.8 % -0.6 % 
18 17.5 % 18.7 % 17.3 % 14.5 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.3 % 
19 18.7 % 19.3 % 14.8 % 19.5 % -0.6 % -1.0 % -0.6 % 
20 18.0 % 18.4 % 15.5 % 18.3 % -0.5 % -0.8 % -0.7 % 
21 17.5 % 18.3 % 15.5 % 16.5 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.5 % 
22 17.5 % 18.5 % 15.4 % 15.9 % -0.4 % -0.8 % -0.5 % 
23 17.8 % 18.9 % 15.4 % 16.0 % -0.4 % -0.6 % -0.6 % 
24 15.4 % 16.7 % 14.1 % 12.3 % -0.6 % -1.1 % -0.5 % 
25 15.3 % 17.1 % 12.9 % 11.8 % -0.4 % -0.7 % -0.6 % 
26 16.7 % 18.2 % 10.5 % 16.7 % -0.3 % -0.6 % -0.3 % 
27 15.8 % 17.2 % 10.8 % 15.0 % -0.4 % -0.6 % -0.6 % 
28 15.4 % 16.6 % 12.2 % 14.0 % -0.5 % -0.5 % -0.4 % 
29 15.3 % 16.7 % 12.5 % 12.7 % -0.5 % -0.8 % -0.6 % 
30 15.5 % 16.7 % 13.5 % 12.9 % -0.4 % -0.6 % -0.6 % 
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Appendix 3: Overview of the returns when x=75%. 
 
Event days CAAR, all 
CAAR, 
normal 
volume 
CAAR, 
low 
volume 
CAAR, 
high 
volume 
Average 
AR (all) 
avg AR 
LOW 
avg AR 
HIGH 
-1 0.3 % 0.4 % -0.6 % 0.2 % 0.3 % -0.6 % 0.2 % 
0 17.0 % 17.5 % 12.2 % 15.5 % 16.8 % 13.0 % 15.4 % 
1 23.1 % 23.6 % 21.7 % 21.0 % 6.6 % 9.9 % 6.1 % 
2 23.1 % 23.6 % 21.5 % 20.3 % 0.0 % 0.5 % -0.1 % 
3 21.7 % 22.3 % 22.7 % 18.6 % 0.6 % 2.2 % 0.5 % 
4 21.1 % 22.1 % 15.4 % 17.7 % -0.4 % -1.9 % -0.6 % 
5 22.3 % 22.6 % 17.2 % 22.4 % -0.5 % -1.7 % 0.1 % 
6 22.0 % 22.2 % 19.2 % 21.6 % -0.5 % -1.0 % -0.8 % 
7 21.6 % 22.1 % 19.2 % 19.4 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.5 % 
8 21.0 % 21.5 % 18.1 % 19.1 % -0.4 % -1.2 % -0.4 % 
9 20.9 % 21.3 % 20.6 % 18.9 % -0.5 % -1.3 % -0.7 % 
10 19.4 % 20.1 % 19.4 % 15.8 % -0.5 % -0.7 % -0.5 % 
11 19.1 % 19.9 % 15.8 % 16.1 % -0.5 % -1.0 % -0.6 % 
12 20.3 % 20.4 % 15.2 % 21.0 % -0.5 % -1.2 % -0.3 % 
13 20.0 % 20.2 % 17.3 % 19.7 % -0.6 % -1.0 % -0.8 % 
14 19.7 % 20.3 % 16.1 % 17.4 % -0.5 % -1.3 % -0.5 % 
15 19.3 % 19.7 % 17.1 % 17.5 % -0.4 % -0.6 % -0.4 % 
16 19.6 % 20.1 % 17.8 % 17.3 % -0.3 % -0.1 % -0.4 % 
17 17.7 % 18.6 % 17.1 % 13.6 % -0.5 % -0.8 % -0.5 % 
18 17.5 % 18.7 % 13.2 % 13.4 % -0.4 % -0.3 % -0.4 % 
19 18.7 % 19.3 % 11.4 % 17.8 % -0.6 % -1.1 % -0.6 % 
20 18.0 % 18.4 % 13.5 % 16.7 % -0.5 % -1.2 % -0.7 % 
21 17.5 % 18.1 % 12.4 % 15.7 % -0.4 % -0.8 % -0.3 % 
22 17.5 % 18.0 % 15.4 % 15.5 % -0.4 % -0.6 % -0.6 % 
23 17.8 % 18.3 % 16.1 % 15.4 % -0.4 % 0.2 % -0.5 % 
24 15.4 % 16.3 % 14.0 % 11.2 % -0.6 % -1.0 % -0.5 % 
25 15.3 % 16.6 % 8.2 % 11.0 % -0.4 % -1.3 % -0.5 % 
26 16.7 % 17.6 % 5.8 % 15.3 % -0.3 % -0.6 % -0.6 % 
27 15.8 % 16.7 % 5.9 % 13.5 % -0.4 % -0.7 % -0.9 % 
28 15.4 % 16.2 % 9.7 % 12.7 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.5 % 
29 15.3 % 16.1 % 12.4 % 11.5 % -0.5 % -1.3 % -0.7 % 
30 15.5 % 16.2 % 14.7 % 11.8 % -0.4 % -0.5 % -0.6 % 
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Johdon tiivistelmä (kypsyysnäyte) 
Epätavallisen vaihtovolyymin vaikutus ostokohteena olevan osakkeen epänormaaleihin tuottoihin 
ostoilmoituksen jälkeisenä aikana – tuloksia Yhdysvalloista 
 
Tutkin kandidaatintutkielmassani kuinka epätavallinen vaihtovolyymi korreloi osakkeen tuottojen kanssa 
tilanteessa, jossa kyseinen yritys päätyy ostoilmoituksen kohteeksi. Vaihtovolyymin on väitetty olevan 
seuraava suuri tutkimuskysymys ja läpimurtojen osa-alue modernissa rahoitustutkimuksessa. Näin väittää 
muun muassa arvostettu ekonomisti John H. Cochrane luennollaan vuonna 2007. 
Tutkielmani johtopäätös on seuraava: yritykset, joiden osakkeet kokevat normaalia suurempaa tai normaalia 
pienempää vaihtovolyymia viikkoa ennen ostokaupan julkistamista on pienemmät epänormaalit tuotot 
julkistamista seuraavan 30 päivän aikana kuin tavallista vaihtovolyymia kokevilla yrityksillä. Tällä ilmiöllä on 
monta mahdollista selitystä, mutta tärkeimpänä mekanismina taustalla näyttäisi olevan se, että 
vaihtovolyymi sisältää informaatiota, joka ei sisälly täysin yrityksen markkinahintaan. 
Tutkielmani koostui 2,805 yksittäisestä ostoilmoituksesta sekä näihin liittyvistä tuotoista Yhdysvalloista 
vuosilta 2002-2015. Tutkielma keskittyi täysin ostettavaan firmaan; ostavan firman vaikutukset jääkööt 
tulevien tutkimusten aiheiksi. Tutkielmassa määräsin kaikki osakkeet kolmeen eri ryhmään: 1) normaalia 
pienemmän volyymin, 2) normaalia suuremman volyymin sekä 3) normaalin volyymin osakkeisiin. Jako 
tapahtui vertaamalla tapahtumaperiodin volyymia referenssiperiodin volyymiin. Tapahtumaperiodi oli 7 
päivän pituinen jakso ennen ostoilmoitusta ja referenssiperiodi 40 päivän pituinen jakso ennen 
ostoilmoitusta. Mikäli tapahtumaperiodin volyymi oli riittävän suuri referenssiperiodin volyymin nähden, 
valikoitui kyseinen osake normaalia suuremman volyymin osakkeiden ryhmään. Vastaava tehtiin pienen 
volyymin osakkeille. Käytin useita eri raja-arvoja päättääkseni osakkeen ryhmänmääräytymisen, jotta 
tulokseni eivät johtuisi pelkästään valitsemistani osakkeista. Vastaavasti tein Welchin kahden otoksen t-testit 
määrittääkseni tilastollisen merkittävyyden tuloksille. Tuloksista tilastollisesti erittäin merkittäviä olivat erot 
normaalien ja epänormaalien volyymin osakkeiden epänormaalien tuottojen välillä. Toistin lisäksi yllä olevat 
laskelmat poistamalla otoksesta mikroyritykset, eli yritykset joiden markkina-arvo oli alle 300 miljoonaa 
dollaria. 
Epänormaalia tuottoa mittasin capital asset pricing –mallin avulla. Laskin sen avulla jokaiselle osakkeelle 
päivittäisen ”alfan”, eli ylituoton. Niitä hyödyntäen laskin eri osakeryhmille keskimääräisen kumulatiivisen 
ylituoton vertailuperiodille, joka alkoi päivää ennen ostoilmoitusta ja päättyi 30 päivää ostoilmoituksen 
jälkeen. 
Tutkimustuloksiani voi hyödyntää ottamalla se osaksi osakkeiden volyymien ja niiden sisältämän 
informaation tulkintaa. Osakkeiden volyymi sisältää paljon informaatiota muun muassa lyhyeksi myynnin 
rajoitteiden vuoksi; esimerkiksi Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) tutkimuksessaan väittävät, että jaksot jolloin 
vaihtovolyymi on pientä, antavat viitteitä huonojen uutisten olemassaolosta. Markkinoilla toimii agentteja, 
joilla on enemmän informaatiota kuin muilla. He eivät kuitenkaan pääse vaihtamaan ja hyötymään tästä 
informaatiosta lyhyeksi myynnin rajoitteiden vuoksi. 
Vaihtovolyymi sisältää erittäin paljon informaatiota erinäisistä yrityksen fundamentaaleista ominaisuuksista 
ja tulevaisuudennäkymistä; täten yksikään tutkimus ei tähän mennessä ole kyennyt antamaan yksiselitteisiä 
vastauksia mitä eri volyymin muutokset ja tasot merkitsevät. Omakin tutkimukseni ottaa kantaa vain pieneen 
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osa-alueeseen tässä viitekehyksessä. Kuitenkin tutkimukseni antaa hyvän lisän jo ennestään tunnettuihin 
mekanismeihin, jotka vaikuttavat yrityksen vaihtovolyymiin. 
 
